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The Forest Products Industry
and Community Stability

Polzin

named

BBER
director

Paul E. Polzin

Paul Polzin has been chosen director of
the University of Montana’
s Bureau of
Business and Economic Research.
Polzin, who assumed his new duties
May 1, is a management professor who
has been a research associate with the
Bureau since 1968 and its director of
economic forecasting since 1983. He
replaces Maxine Johnson, who retired as
Bureau director Feb. 5.
Polzin specializes in regional economics
and applied econometrics. He was a
consulting research economist with the
U.S. Forest Service from 1972 to 1977
and continues to work closely with that
agency on issues relating to natural
resources and the economy.
He earned a doctorate and a master’
s
degree in economics at Michigan State
University in 1968 and in 1964 received a
bachelor’
s in that field at The University
of Michigan.
A fifteen-person committee made up of
UM, state and local government, and
private industry representatives chose
Polzin Bureau director. He was one of
three finalists in a national search.

MONTANA

BUSINESS QUARTERLY
Volume 26, number 2

O

Summer 1988

The Forest Products Industry
and Community Stability:
The Evolution of the Issue

Con H Schallau

O
^

The U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement: Implications for Montana

Stephen Maly
Lauren McKinsey

Bad Faith: Liability Law in Montana

Jerry Furniss
Jack Morton

LARRY GIANCHETTA
Dean, School of Business
Administration
PAUL E. POLZIN
Director, Bureau o f Business
and Economic Research
MARY LOGAN LENIHAN
Editor
CAROLINE PATTERSON
HAEFELE
Production Editor

2750—UM Printing Service*

T he Montana Business Quarterly, (ISSN 0026-9921) is published in March, June, September
and December o f each year by the Bureau o f Business and Economic Research, and is a service
o f the University o f Montana, Missoula. T he subscription rates for the Quarterly are $15.00
per year, $25.00 for two years, $35.00 for three years, and $4.00 per issue. Second class postage
paid at Missoula, MT 59812. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to the Montana Business
Quarterly, Bureau o f Business and Economic Research, University o f Montana, Missoula,
M T 59812.
Contents o f the Quarterly reflect the views and opinions o f the authors and do not necessarily
represent those o f the Bureau, the School o f Business, or the University. The contents o f this
publication may be reproduced without the consent o f the publisher and/or authors. Proper
credit should be given to the Quarterly and its contributors for the use o f any published
material.
The Montana Business Quarterly is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, 300
N. Zeeb Rd., Ann Arbor, MI 49106.
Reprints o f the articles are not available but additional copies o f the Quarterly can be secured
at $4.00 per copy.
All inquiries regarding subscriptions, publications, etc., should be addressed to:
Montana Business Quarterly
Bureau o f Business and
Economic Research
University o f Montana
Missoula, M T 59812

pressures o f environmentalists, while at the
same time wisely managing the federal
forests and ensuring stability in those
communities who depend on the timber
industry as a major source o f jobs? Con
Schallau, a respected Forest Service
economist, has been studying the issue f o r
several years. This article, an update on
the evolution o f the community stability
issue, is based on a presentation he made
in November 1987 to the National
Conference on Community Stability in
Forest-Based Economies, held in Portland.

this year, I had the
Earlier
opportunity to discuss community

The Forest
Products
Industry and
Community
Stability:
The Evolution
of the Issue
CON H SCHALLAU
Over forty years have passed since
Congress gave the Forest Service specific
guidelines f o r considering community
stability in setting its policies. Federal
officials obviously recognized that a
change in the availability o f federal timber
could seriously impact those rural areas
whose economies are based primarily on
the wood products industry. Western
Montana is certainly an example o f a
timber-dependent region.
While the Forest Service must consider
the issue o f community stability, Congress
has never defined its meaning. What
factors comprise community stability? How
are they measured? Forest Service officials
are still wrestling with this issue. Forest
Service critics complicate the matter by
demanding changes in Forest Service
policies or practices, changes that could
affect community stability.
As a result, the topic o f community
stability remains a vexing issue. How can
the Forest Service respond to the needs o f
the timber industry and the public
2

stability. The title assigned to me was
“
Community Stability—Orthodoxy vs.
Reality.”It was “
mission impossible,”
because, despite all the writing and
rhetoric, there is no consensus
regarding the issue o f community
stability. Had I chosen a title, it
would have been “
Community
Stability—in Reality, There Is No
Orthodoxy.”
Others have described the lack of
consensus regarding the issue o f
community stability. In December
1986, for example, High Country
News featured an article by George
Sibley about the Shelton (Washington)
Cooperative Sustained Yield Unit.
When the Shelton Unit was created in
1946, the Simpson Timber Company
was given exclusive harvesting rights
for 100 years to 113,000 acres of
virgin Douglas-fir and hemlock timber
on the Olympic National Forest. In
exchange, Simpson had to commit
some of its remaining old growth
plus cutover lands — 237,000 acres
total—to sustained-yield management
to help stabilize employment in the
communities o f Shelton and
McCleary, Washington.
In his article, “
The America That
Did Not Happen,”Sibley noted:
... “
stabilization”is another one
o f those tricky words—a word
that, like Humpty-Dumpty said
to Alice, “
means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more
nor less.”Any effort to derive an
operational definition of
“
stabilization”out o f the
agreement leads one to the
conclusion that the word didn’
t
mean very much at all to either
Simpson, the Forest Service or
the people of the region.
Although I agree with Sibley that
stabilization can be interpreted in
many ways, I do not agree that the

word did not mean very much. The
Great Depression was fresh in the
minds of the cosigners when the
Shelton Unit was established in 1946.
Furthermore, it was common
knowledge that Simpson, like other
private forest landowners in the Puget
Sound area, was about to run out of
mature timber. One did not have to
use much imagination to know what
could happen to the Shelton and
McCleary economies if timber
harvesting from public forest land was
not accelerated.
Today, the future of many other
timber-dependent communities in the
nonmetropolitan West resembles the
situation facing Shelton, Washington,
after World War II. Short of
unprecedented success in achieving
economic diversification, communities
will experience hard times. Unless, of
course, additional timber supplies
become available. This is why the
subject o f community stability—
whatever it means—has attracted so
much attention.
Community stability cannot be
understood without a sense o f history.
Consequently, I will begin with a
review of how this concept evolved as
a forestry issue.
Like a ship at sea, the concept of
community stability has accumulated
a lot o f barnacles and needs a new
coat o f paint. I will examine how we
got here. Along the way I will pay
particular attention to some nagging
questions—barnacles and oxidized
paint, so to speak—that impede
progress.
T o begin, let us consider where
community stability fits into the
hierarchy of USDA Forest Service
goals. O f critical importance is the
question, “
Which is more important,
sustained yield or community
stability?”

i§Despite a lack o f consensus, I believe most observers can
grasp how community stability, like sustained yield, can be a
means to achieving satisfaction and well-being.
Which is more important,
sustained yield or community
stability?
spectre of stranded
Thecommunities
in cutover areas of

the Great Lake states attracted
considerable attention (Sparhawk and
Brush 1929). Nevertheless, Congress
did not enact explicit direction to
assure community stability until nearly
fifty years after the National Forest
System was established in 1897.
Because o f abundant timber on
private lands, demand for public
stumpage was practically nonexistent
until after World War II. The Forest
Service could not affect the economic
development of timber-dependent
communities until it became a
significant force in the market place
for timber products; there was no
need for Congress to intervene in the
name o f community stability.
Although community stability was
not an early policy issue, sustained
yield was. The fear of a future timber
famine led to the concept o f sustained
yield (that is, to provide for “
a
continuous supply o f timber”
)
contained in the 1897 Organic Act.
During the 1920s, industry
representatives in the Pacific
Northwest were concerned that
premature harvesting on national
forest lands would disrupt the market
for their stumpage. Strangely enough,
it was the oversupply o f private timber
that fostered sustained-yield
management on public forests in the
West.
The late David T. Mason is
generally regarded as the granddaddy
o f the nation’
s concept of sustained
yield. Mason (1927) envisioned
sustained-yield management as a
means for reducing the availability of
timber in the Pacific Northwest and
thereby discouraging lumber
companies in the South from moving
to the West. In its barest form,
Mason’
s concept would have served to
restrain entry into the forest products
industry in the Pacific Northwest.
The Great Depression postponed
official adoption of Mason’
s sustainedyield concept. Although timber
harvesting in the National Forest was

minimal, the sale of timber was
temporarily halted to minimize
problems for the private sector.
Although the secretary o f the interior
was authorized in 1937 to establish
sustained-yield units for the support of
dependent communities and local
industries, no units were established
until after World War II (Dana
1956).
Decisions regarding custodial
activities—in contrast to timber
harvesting—had little or no effect on
the economic performance o f timberdependent communities.
Consequently, the National Forest
System played a passive role as far as
community stability was concerned.
This passive role ended with the
passage of the Sustained Yield Forest
Management Act of 1944 (53 Stat.
132). This act authorized the
secretaries of agriculture and the
interior to establish either (1)
cooperative sustained-yield units
requiring both public and private
forest land, or (2) federal sustainedyield units consisting only o f federal
land to “
promote the stability of
forest industries, o f employment, of
communities and taxable forest
wealth, through continuous supplies of
timber.”The Shelton cooperative unit
on the Olympic National Forest and
five federal units elsewhere in the
West resulted from this act. O f the
latter, only the Lakeview (in Oregon),
Big Valley (in California), and the
Grays Harbor (in Washington) remain
active.
No cooperative units or federal
sustained-yield units were established
by the Department o f the Interior. In
1946 and 1947, however, the secretary
established twelve marketing areas
consisting o f Oregon and California
(O&C) lands in western Oregon, “
the
product of which should logically go
to definite marketing areas”(Dana
1956). These marketing areas were
abolished in April 1959.
The establishment of the O&C
master units and the cooperative and
federal sustained-yield units comprised
o f national forest lands represents the
high water mark as far as community
stability policies are concerned. In the
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ensuing twenty to twenty-five years,
concern for community stability
waned. The Forest Service shifted its
rationale for sustained yield from
community stability to “
conservation
o f resources to help meet the wants of
future generations”(Josephson 1976).
As Waggener (1977) predicted, the
enactment o f the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA) o f 1976
sparked renewed interest in the issue
o f community stability. For example,
the greatest interest expressed in
public responses to draft regulations,
developed pursuant to the NFMA,
concerned proposed changes in
nondeclining even-flow timber harvest
policy. More recently, below-cost
timber sales have been rationalized in
the name o f community stability.
Whether this renewed interest will
help timber-dependent communities in
the Pacific Northwest achieve
economic stability remains to be seen,
however.
Despite a lack o f consensus, I
believe most observers can grasp how
community stability, like sustained
yield, can be a means to achieving
satisfaction and well-being. But these
policies may be mutually exclusive. If
so, which is more important? Congress
is responsible for the answer to this
question, but to date, unfortunately,
its actions have done more to
obfuscate than to clarify the question
(Schallau and Alston 1987).
In the meantime, the Forest Service
has, at least implicitly, provided its
own ranking o f the community
stability and sustained-yield goals.
Acting to prevent the possibility of a
shortfall in timber production that
had been forecast in the Douglas-fir
Supply Study (USDA Forest Service
1969), the Forest Service issued an
emergency directive that spelled out
the now famous nondeclining evenflow policy (USDA Forest Service
1973).
Implementing the nondeclining cut
policy caused an immediate reduction
in the programmed harvests from the
national forests in the Pacific
Northwest. The former policy would
have postponed a significant shortfall
in the allowable cut for ninety to 120
3

* */ fin d it hard to accept the notion that a single, uniformly
applied scenario fo r scheduling timber harvesting will
promote . . . stability fo r all timber-dependent communities.93
years. It could be argued that, had
the Forest Service been more
committed to economic stability, they
would have adopted an alternative
scenario and thereby postponed the
decline to allow the communities
sufficient time to adjust. The choice
o f going with the nondeclining evenflow policy may imply that the Forest
Service ranks sustained yield ahead of
community stability. Or does it? It all
depends on the answer to the next
question.

How is community stability
achieved?
Code o f Federal Regulations
T hedescribes
the “
Disposal o f national

forest timber according to
management plans.”This code states
that management plans shall “
be
based on the principle of sustained
yield . . . ”and “
provide . . . an even
flow o f national forest timber in order
to facilitate the stabilization of
communities and o f opportunities for
employment.”This code suggests that
community stability will be achieved
by an even-flow timber harvesting
policy.
I find it hard to accept the notion
that a single, uniformly applied
scenario for scheduling timber
harvesting will promote economic
stability for all timber-dependent
communities. T o do so presumes that
all communities have the same
economic future. A more logical
policy would recognize the possibility
that some communities are beyond
help; some communities do not need
help; and others might benefit from a
departure scenario. I do not see how
we can fashion a reasonable policy
without a way to identify communities
that might benefit from a departure
scenario. In the interest o f finding a
community stability indicator, I would
like to share my “
economic coercion”
hypothesis.
Community stability exists if all the
following questions can be answered
with a “
yes":
•Did the majority o f persons
moving to a community within
the last decade perceive that by
4

doing so they were able to
maintain their permanent
income?1
•Did the majority of persons
moving from a community within
the last decade perceive that by
doing so they were able to
maintain their permanent
income?
•Do the majority o f persons
choosing to remain in a
community perceive that by
doing so they are able to
maintain their permanent
income?
A majority o f “
no”answers would, I
hypothesize, indicate that all is not
well in Timber Town, USA.
Although I have no theoretical
proof, I do have anecdotal evidence
that my hypothesis might help
determine if a community is stable.
For example, on April 1, 1987, the
Corvallis, Oregon Gazette Times
carried the following statement by
Dale Romrell (1987): “...I would like
to see Corvallis prosper enough so
someday I could sell my house easily.”
Furthermore, I asked my barber if he
sympathized with Romrell. He did,
and added that he would also like to
be able to sell his business. He did
not want to be the last guy out of
town.

Has community stability
acquired econom ic standing?
Austin, writing in the
Phyllis
August 1987 issue o f Forest Watch

states that, “
The typical forest
industry CEO isn ’
t worried about
harvesting trees but about policy and
finance issues....”She goes on to
decry corporate raiders who “
have
‘
accelerated harvest on their minds’to
increase profits, at the expense o f the
forest.”
Ironically, the August 1987 issue of
the Journal o f Forestry featured
articles about “
below-cost”timber
sales. If you have been following this

1According to Pearce (1983), permanent income
is “
the average income that the individual or
household expects to receive over a period of
years."

issue, you know that the Forest Service
has been criticized for not recovering
all costs associated with its timber
sales program. So what should be
done—does the Forest Service accept
or reject the emphasis on the bottom
line? Needless to say, critics cannot
have it both ways!
As we all know, Congress rejected
the bottom line mentality when it
intervened and created the National
Forest System to assure a perpetual
supply of timber. As a result, we have
a public goods-and-services-producing
institution that defies the fundamental
assumptions of mainstream economic
analysis. Furthermore most policy
issues—including community
stability—have resulted because
Congress has not put limits on how
far the Forest Service can deviate
from the bottom-line mentality of the
market place.
Mainstream economic theory (that
is, neoclassical theory) presumes that
maximization o f profits is the
fundamental criterion. Since profit
making, per se, is not the objective of
the National Forest System, the
existence o f the National Forest
System cannot be rationalized by
conventional theory. On the contrary,
the Sagebrush Rebellion was, in part,
the brain child o f economists who
used neoclassical economics to justify
privatizing the National Forest
System.
So where does community stability
fit in? Does it have economic
standing? In its strictest form,
conventional theory assumes a market
economy with perfect competition
between buyers and sellers. That is,
no trader can influence prices, and
excess profits will not persist because
new firms are free to enter the
industry. In fact, however, private
firms cannot enter the log-supplying
business throughout much o f the West
because Uncle Sam holds most o f the
remaining inventory.
Neoclassical theory also assumes
that market forces will maintain full
employment. Persistent
unemployment, if it exists at all, is
assumed to be voluntary. Instability in
the marketplace will be o f short
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the selling o f “
cheap”stumpage might represent
implicit compensation to the processing industry f o r the
monopoly rents earned elsewhere by the Forest Service.
. . .

duration and will be self-correcting.
As far as conventional economic
theory is concerned, therefore,
community stability is an irrelevant
issue.
In fact, labor and capital are not
perfectly mobile. Furthermore,
voluntary unemployment is not
commonplace, and labor and capital
are often frozen in place. A
community stability policy—however
described—may not be necessary, but
the question o f how to achieve
economic stability has standing in
some economic circles. How else do
you explain the development of
Keynesian economics?
Let us not toss out the baby with
the bath water. Just because the
fundamental assumptions of
mainstream economic theory do not
represent reality is no reason to ignore
the usefulness o f the tools o f economic
analysis. Let me illustrate by
considering the following question.

Is the USDA Forest Service
subsidizing the forest products
industry?
number of processors
Aninincreasing
the West depend on national

forests for all o f their timber. In such
instances, the Forest Service is a
monopolist. Economic theory says that
a monopolist maximizes profits by
supplying less product than it would
have to in a competitive market.
Restricting supply would result in
higher prices and, consequently,
higher profits—all to the detriment of
society at large.
Hagenstein and others (1987)
analyzed the timber harvesting policies
of the Forest Service in the Pacific
Northwest and found the Forest
Service behaving like a monopolist.
They compared annual timber harvest
and prices for current nondeclining
even-flow (“
baseline”
) policies with
those that would be obtained if a
truly competitive market for logs
existed. They found that
projected prices for stumpage in
constant dollars on the Westside
(western Washington and
Oregon) for the 1980s were 81

percent below the baseline
forecast, and those on the
Eastside (eastern Washington and
Oregon and all o f Idaho) were 72
percent lower.
Furthermore, they estimated that if
current public timber-harvest policies
prevail during the 1980s and 1990s,
about $4 billion of income annually
will be shifted from individual
consumers o f forest products and the
timber-processing industry to public
and other timber owners in the
Northwest.
Critics o f the below-cost timber sale
policies have accused the Forest
Service of subsidizing the forest
products industry in the name of
community stability (Wilkinson 1985).
By themselves, individual below-cost
sales might well be described as a
subsidy. Considered in a global sense,
however, the selling o f “
cheap”
stumpage might represent implicit
compensation to the processing
industry for the monopoly rents
earned elsewhere by the Forest
Service.

What will take the place of the
forest products industry?
nation’
s leaders are struggling
Theto find
ways to reenergize our

economy. The challenge is
particularly acute for small towns and
rural areas where forest resources are
abundant, for example, in the Pacific
Northwest. In the seven years between
1978 and 1985, Oregon’
s per capita
income slipped from better than the
national average to 91 percent of the
national average —its lowest in fiftyfive years—and the gap is widening.2
Washington’
s economy is faring
better, thanks mainly to the U. S.
defense buildup during the last seven
years, but a slowdown in defense
spending would damage the economy
considerably. Besides, the economic

2According to J. Cartright, losing ground is the
growing gap between Oregon and national
income. Unpublished staff report to the foint
Legislative Committee on Trade and
Development. 1986. Salem, OR.
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plight o f rural areas in Washington
resembles that o f their counterparts in
Oregon (Coit 1987).
Traditionally, most new jobs are
created by small, usually existing
businesses. Few communities stand a
chance o f attracting a new, large
employer. Consequently, retention of
existing firms is o f prime importance.
Nevertheless, diversification is an
appropriate long-term goal for some
timber-dependent communities. But
this process is slow and fraught with
pitfalls and dependent on a viable
public and private infrastructure.
Traditionally, the infrastructure has
been supported by timber.
Tourism and recreation are often
touted as the solution to ailing forestresource-based communities. They
may be the solution, but only in
isolated situations where four-season
facilities and entertainment can be
provided. Lake Tahoe, Nevada/
California; Sun Valley, Idaho; and
Bend, Oregon are familiar examples.
Otherwise, tourism and recreation are
adjuncts to existing industries that
provide year-round employment.
A remote, stand-alone resort
complex that attracts seasonal use
may generate substantial cash flow
and still not bolster the surrounding
economy. Rajender and others (1967)
encountered this phenomenon in their
study of the economy o f Teton
County, Wyoming. Referring to the
“
leakage”from the county, they point
out that
there is a complicating factor in
that many o f the summer
residents are seasonal workers
who have a permanent residence
elsewhere. These people are
inclined to spend relatively little
money during their residence in
the county; the bulk o f their
earnings goes into expenditures at
their regular place o f residence.
In fact, they observed that, because
o f this leakage o f funds, the multiplier
effect actually declined over a fiveyear period.
Closer to home, we simulated the
job loss associated with the projected
shortfall in timber harvesting from
5

. . . the Japanese are trying desperately to retain their
manufacturing capability to avoid the mistakes that caused
industrial decline in the United States. . . .
public and private forest lands in
western Oregon (Olson, Schallau and
Maki 1988). We examined the
cumulative employment effects of a
hypothetical 20 percent reduction in
harvesting from the national forests
and the shortfall in harvesting from
forest industry lands projected by
Beuter and others (1976).
We used growth rates provided by
the U.S. Department of Commerce
for each o f the seventy-five industries
in our representation of the Oregon
economy. We also allowed for
technological changes in all industries
including the forest products industry.
Our simulation showed that the
economy o f western Oregon will
continue to grow in spite o f a shortfall
in timber harvesting. But the
difference —the impact —between the
baseline scenario and the scenario
with the shortfall is substantial.
Furthermore, our simulation suggests
that despite continued growth of all
nontimber-related industries—
agriculture, high-tech, tourism,
transportation, wholesale and retail
trade —the state’
s economy will need
an extraordinary and sustained shot in
the arm to overcome the effects o f the
shortfall in timber harvesting.

Does the forest products
industry matter?
years ago, John Kenneth
Thirty
Galbraith (1958) had this to say

about our affluent society:

...The greatest prospect that we
face —indeed what must now be
counted one o f the central
economic goals of our society—is
to eliminate toil as a required
economic institution. This is not
a utopian vision. We are already
well on the way. Only an
extraordinary elaborate exercise
in social camouflage has kept us
from seeing what has been
happening.
Within a decade, many observers
began to share Galbraith’
s concern.
For instance, in 1973, Daniel Bell
popularized the notion that the
United States should shed the sunset
6

industries o f the past—that is, heavy
industries—and welcome the sunrise
sectors of the future, namely services
and high tech. We had become a
“
post-industrial”society and the
sooner we recognized this
metamorphosis, the better off we
would be!
The notion o f the post-industrial
society is embraced by those in high
places. In his 1985 annual report on
trade agreements programs, President
Reagan (1985) had this to say:
The move from an industrial
society toward a “
post-industrial”
service economy has been one of
the greatest changes to affect the
developed world since the
Industrial Revolution. The
progression o f an economy such
as America’
s from agriculture to
manufacturing to services is a
natural change.
According to a spokesperson for the
New York Stock Exchange (Seligman
1987), “
a strong manufacturing sector
is not a requisite for a prosperous
economy.”Then there is Malcolm
Forbes who stated (Cohen and Zysman
1987):
Instead o f ringing in the decline
o f our economic power, a servicedriven economy signals the most
advanced stage o f economic
development . . . . Instead o f
following the Pied Piper of
“
reindustrialization,”the U.S.
should be concentrating its efforts
on strengthening its services.
Events o f the recent past —the
recession o f 1981 and 1982, declining
industrial productivity, trade and
budget deficits, and o f course, the
stock market crash of this past
October—have had a sobering effect.
We have become more cautious and
introspective as Japan continues to
assert its economic power.
Many industrial observers are
expressing concern about the growing
tendency toward offshore
manufacturing—the hollowing o f our
economy. The fear is that offshore
manufacturing will result in the loss
o f onshore control (Cohen and

Zysman 1987). The fact that the
Japanese are trying desperately to
retain their manufacturing capability
to avoid the mistakes that caused
industrial decline in the United States
should, according to some business
analysts, stir us into action (Borrus
and Holstein 1987).
In a recent essay, “
Road from
Constantinople,”Sudia (1987)
described Wallerstein’
s world system
hypothesis. This hypothesis would
have increasing amounts o f U.S.
capital seeking more lucrative ventures
in foreign capitals. If this process has
merit, New York will relinquish its
role as the world’
s financial capital by
the middle o f the next century. Sudia
thinks the United States has a chance
to survive challenges to its economic
authority, but “
if we pursue the beef
and citrus markets in Japan—if U.S.
capital goes to Japan—we will be just
another country on the road from
Constantinople. ”
Perhaps the most forceful challenge
to the legitimacy of the concept of the
post-industrial economy has been
provided by Stephen S. Cohen and
John Zysman, two academicians at the
University o f California at Berkeley’
s
Roundtable on the International
Economy (BRIE). They claim that we
do not now have a post-industrial
economy, and we had better not
acquire one. In their recent book,
Manufacturing Matters: the Myth o f
the Post-industrial Economy, Cohen
and Zysman (1987) state
Rather than an element and sign
o f economic development, much
o f the growth of service
employment may be a way of
spreading around economic
stagnation, as we all take in each
other’
s linen for wash or, at least,
each other’
s relatives for care.
Any student o f economic growth
theory will appreciate Cohen and
Zysman’
s emphasis on productivity
and how strongly linked it is to a
nation’
s standard of living: “
America’
s
preeminent wealth and power is based
on American productivity being
higher than that elsewhere.”How can
one logically presume that a shift to
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“in the future, how we as a nation regard the role o f
manufacturing will . . . determine how well the forest
products industry and dependent communities prosper.
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...if we lose mastery and control
of manufacturing, the highpaying service jobs that are
directly linked to manufacturing
will, in a few short rounds of
product and process innovation,
seem to wither away (only to
spout up offshore, where the
manufacturing went).
It is the high-value-added
service roles tied directly to
manufacturing (whether they are
located in service or
manufacturing categories) that we
must hold and develop if we are
to remain a powerful economy. It
is not manufacturing jobs per se.
In brief, in order for the shift of
employment to services to be
developmental and not become a
shift to poverty, we must
maintain mastery and control of
manufacturing production.

Conclusion
what does this have to do with
S ocommunity
stability? Cohen and

Zysman (1987) assert that many oldline industries have a transitional
role —to promote the development of
state-of-the-art equipment and more
efficient production to meet foreign
competition. In this regard, I believe
the forest products industry and
dependent communities can play a
role.
The ability of the United States to
compete well in foreign markets is on
the national agenda. Policies
influencing our nation’
s industrial
strength will be shaped by Congress.
This does not mean that such policies
will be created without regard for the
role that individual industries play in
maintaining our economic prowess.
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In the future, how we as a nation
regard the role o f manufacturing will,
to a considerable degree, determine
how well the forest products industry
and dependent communities prosper.
I believe that recognition o f the
serious challenge to U.S.
competitiveness should have a bearing
on how the community stability issue
is resolved. I agree with Cohen and
Zysman (1987) that we must “
avoid
the idiocies that result when we make
domestic policy as if our internal
choices had no consequences in
international markets . . . [and] we
must link domestic policy to
international policy in a more positive
way.”
In the same vein, I would add that
we must avoid the idiocies that result
when we disregard the cumulative
economic effect o f the policies of
private forest landowners as if their
contribution had no bearing on the
future of dependent communities.
I believe we must avoid the idiocies
that result when we disregard the
monopoly profits earned by the Forest
Service in the Pacific Northwest as if
their existence had no bearing on the
economic evaluation o f below-cost
timber sales.
Finally, I believe we must avoid the
idiocies that result when we make
community-stability policy as if our
choices.had no consequences in
regional and national markets.
□
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Transborder transactions

The U.S. -Canada
Free Trade
Agreement:
Implications for
Montana
STEPHEN MALY
LAUREN McKINSEY
States and Canada have
ThetheUnited
most extensive trade

relationship in the world. But despite
the unmatched flows o f goods and
services across the border, significant
barriers to trade between the two
countries remain. Negotiations toward
a comprehensive bilateral free trade
agreement (FTA) were initiated in
May 1986, and concluded in October
1987. President Reagan and Prime
Minister Mulroney formally signed the
agreement on January 2, 1988.
Neither country achieved all o f its
objectives in the negotiation.
Nevertheless, the FTA is a remarkable
document. Ratification would create
the world’
s largest free trade area, a
continental market of 265 million
people. Both the Reagan
administration and the Mulroney
government have hailed the FTA as a
historic accomplishment in U.S.Canada relations and a “
win*win
situation,”meaning the benefits to
both countries outweigh the costs.
Their optimism is predicated on the
expectation o f net increases in

The most important elements of the
agreement include the removal of
tariffs, the lifting o f certain
quantitative and qualitative
restrictions, and the easing o f
regulations on border crossings for
business purposes.
Tariffs. The agreement calls for
the elimination o f all tariffs and
establishes a staging process whereby
certain tariffs would be removed
immediately, others after five years,
and the rest at the end o f ten years.
Quantitative and qualitative
restrictions. Quotas, embargoes and
minimum price requirements to
restrict trade will not be allowed,
except in accordance with the rules of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) rules, which permit
measures for health, safety, security,
conservation and short supply. Export
restrictions based on conservation
needs may be taken, but they must
provide for the sharing o f the resource
with the other party and must not
create price discrimination by other
means.
Exit, entry, and customs
restrictions. Certain immigration laws
and customs procedures inhibit
business transactions. Investors and
professional service providers, such as
architects, engineers and consultants,
have been held up at the border by
red tape. Personnel from export firms
have had trouble crossing the border
to perform maintenance, warranty,
and other after-sales services on
commercial or industrial equipment.
The FTA establishes a list o f qualified
business persons who will be able to
cross the border for temporary stays
under special visa classification.

“The F T A is not comprehensive; certain industries and
specific items were either excluded from the agenda or
dropped from the text at various stages o f the negotiations.
National treatment
Important provisions o f the FT A are
based on the internationally
recognized principle of national
treatment, whereby foreign
commercial entities are treated in a
non-discriminating fashion, as if they
were domestic firms.
Financial services. The agreement
on financial services is a self-contained
component o f the FTA, to be
administered by the U.S. Treasury
Department. It removes essentially all
existing discrimination faced by U.S.
financial institutions operating in
Canada, allows the flexibility to
acquire Canadian financial services
firms, and allows financial firms on
both sides o f the border to compete
on a more equal basis.
Investment. The investment portion
of the FTA provides reciprocal
guarantees against discriminatory
barriers and regulations that can
threaten the security of transborder
capital flows. United States investors
wishing to directly purchase Canadian
firms valued at less than $150 million
in Canadian dollars will not require
approval from Canadian investment
screening authorities. Indirect
acquisitions, involving Canadian
subsidiaries o f acquired foreign parent
companies, will no longer be screened
after a phase-out period.
Government procurement. The
U.S. and Canadian governments apply
various “
buy national”preferences to
favor domestic goods and services.
These preferences inhibit competition
from foreign producers. Under the
FTA, suppliers of goods that are
manufactured in the United States or
Canada and which contain at least 50
percent U.S. or Canadian content will
be treated on an equal basis to
suppliers o f domestic goods for
covered procurements.
Services. The Canada-U.S. FTA is
the first international agreement
governing trade and investment in
services industries. The FTA commits
both countries to work toward mutual
recognition o f licensing and
certification requirements in areas not
already covered by reciprocal
agreements. Future requirements for

individuals providing services, such as
accountants and engineers, will be
based on competence, not nationality.
Standards. Product and labor
standards sometimes inhibit bilateral
trade. Notwithstanding legitimate
public policy goals for which technical
regulations and standards are
maintained (e.g., to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, to
preserve the environment, and to
protect security interests), some
standards-related measures hinder
trade unnecessarily. The FTA
obligates both countries to harmonize
federal-level standards to the greatest
extent possible, and to promote the
harmonization o f private standards.

Dispute settlement
Fashioning an effective mechanism to
settle trade disputes was a major
Canadian objective in the
negotiations. Most bilateral trade is
conducted on friendly terms, so the
new method o f resolving disputes will
probably affect a relatively small
proportion o f total bilateral exchange.
Still, conflicts have arisen in recent
years over goods o f enormous value to
one or both countries. Since
frequently resorting to protective and
retaliatory “
trade remedies”can
eliminate the benefits o f free trade, a
Canada-U.S. Trade Commission
would be created to help avoid and
mitigate such problems.
Countervail and antidumping
actions. Each country will continue
unilaterally to administer and enforce
its countervailing duty and
antidumping statutes. However,
special binational dispute settlement
panels can review whether final
administrative decisions are
appropriate under national laws. The
FTA thus creates a binational
mechanism that replaces judicial
review o f decisions taken by the U.S.
International Trade Commission, the
U.S. Department o f Commerce, and
their counterpart agencies in Canada.
Panel decisions will be binding, so
petitioners will no longer have
recourse to national courts, such as
the U.S. International Trade Court.
Safeguards. The FTA provides for
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a safeguard system that parallels
Section 201 o f the Trade Act of
1974—also known as the “
escape
clause”—to preserve the rights of
workers and firms in both countries to
gain relief from import-related injury.
While the United States and Canada
have not used safeguard actions
against each other very often, the
possibility o f doing so reduces the
certainty of market access. Rules on
the use of safeguard actions need to
be included in the FTA to facilitate
corporate planning.

Unfinished business: non-tariff
barriers
The FTA is not comprehensive;
certain industries and specific items
were either excluded from the agenda
or dropped from the text at various
stages o f the negotiations. Some o f the
products not covered by the
agreement, such as steel and lumber,
are expected to be handled by
separate negotiations (although these
items may later fall under the purview
o f the dispute settlement mechanism).
In other sectors, stiff and wellorganized opposition to prospective
features of the FTA compelled trade
officials to explicitly exempt some
types of trade and simply ignore
others.
Many non-tariff measures are not
covered by the FTA. Both national
governments employ a variety of
incentive and equalization programs
that appear to give certain industries
an advantage in some export markets.
Proponents o f a truly comprehensive
trade agreement were also compelled,
in the end, to acknowledge the
political and administrative difficulties
o f fashioning an accord that would
legally bind provinces and states
without fomenting constitutional
challenges.
Several policies at the national level
can be construed as unfair trade
practices. One example is building
codes that may require a higher level
o f construction quality for imports.
Another is transportation practices,
which can entail direct subsidies to
move certain products or indirect
subsidies in the form o f requirements
9

Free trade creates opportunities, but cannot guarantee that
companies will seize them.
that shipments in domestic waters
must be made on domestic carriers.
Another example, in Canada, is the
use of state trading agencies such as
the Canadian Wheat Board.
With one clear exception—the
treatment o f wine imported to
Canada from the United States —the
FTA does not extend into areas of
provincial jurisdiction. It also does not
appear to alter or nullify the various
powers o f state governments to
regulate commerce within their
boundaries. States maintain “
Buy
American”clauses in rules governing
contract awards for some types of
construction and maintenance
projects. Other examples o f non-tariff
barriers that the FTA does not
eliminate include: state and provincial
farm support; special tax and public
sector financial incentives; direct loans
and loan guarantees to small and
medium-sized businesses; state
regulations restricting foreign
ownership o f insurance and banking
firms, or farmland; and other
promotional and support services
provided to exporters.

Terms of abrogation
Either country can withdraw from the
FTA after giving the other six months’
notice o f intent. In addition, if an
agreement on a new bilateral regime
for trade remedies laws is not reached
after the seven-year period specified in
the dispute settlement provisions,
either country could terminate the
agreement. This feature provides a
legal means of escape from obligations
that do not lead to anticipated
benefits (Office o f the U.S. Trade
Representative 1988).

10

Gains from Trade
in Theory
theory and the experience
Economic
(of western trading nations strongly

indicate that the gains from freer
trade outweigh the losses, usually
referred to as the costs o f adjustment.
In general, trade liberalization leads
to greater economic efficiency,
productivity, and growth, which, in
turn, generate increased employment
and higher incomes and result in
more stable prices and lower interest
rates. Greater efficiencies are realized
through specialization, larger
production runs, and other economies
o f scale.
The reduction or elimination of
tariff and non-tariff barriers lowers
consumer prices, increases consumer
choice, and raises the quality and
availability of goods and services.
Benefits to industry include market
expansion, lower input costs, greater
opportunities for product
diversification, and lower risks to
investors in export-oriented firms. In
the long run, freer trade, because it
appears to stimulate growth, can also
lead to import substitution as small
domestic firms seize opportunities to
supply the larger companies engaged
in trade.
All o f these points apply to the
United States and Canada. Closer
analysis, mainly by Canadian
economists, has yielded positive (if
wide-ranging) calculations o f net
growth in Gross National Product
(GNP) resulting from a bilateral free
trade accord (Whaley 1985). The net
effects of gradual but substantial
tariff reductions appear modest but
the benefits are nonetheless real: even
a 1 or 2 percent rise in U.S. GNP
translates into substantial employment
benefits. In the U.S., each $1 billion
in trade is associated with
approximately 25,000 jobs (U.S.
Department o f Commerce 1986).
The gain for Canada is expected to
be greater because small countries
benefit the m ost—via economies of
scale and market access—from closer
integration with larger ones. Both
countries should enjoy some benefit
from trade diversion. Each country
can save money by buying goods in

North America, goods that might
otherwise have been purchased from
overseas suppliers where tariffs would
still apply (Wonnacott 1987).
Another significant benefit to both
countries is the enhanced security of
investments that would result from a
formal trade agreement. This may be
as important to Canada, in the long
run, as gaining more secure access to
U.S. markets for Canadian exports.
United States firms are also more
likely to expand their operations in
Canada because the trade agreement
substantially reduces the likelihood of
any future discriminatory actions
similar to the National Energy Policy
and the restrictive practices of the
Foreign Investment Review Agency in
the 1970s. Since Canada ranks third
as a source o f direct foreign
investment in the United States, and
such investments have increased
dramatically in recent years, the
reciprocal security provided by the
agreement is an important benefit to
those sectors o f the U.S. economy
reliant on Canadian capital for
expansion.
Estimates o f the effects o f bilateral
free trade rest on assumptions about
increased specialization, higher
productivity, trends in the labor
market and the realization of
economies o f scale in key sectors.
These aggregate expectations are, in
turn, based on the assumption that
individual firms will behave in an
economically rational manner if
barriers to trade are removed. Thus,
the gains from freer trade are
predicated on business decisions that
are perhaps more free from
nationalistic and other non
commercial motivations than can be
reasonably expected. Free trade
creates opportunities, but cannot
guarantee that companies will seize
them.
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11Montana . . . has a small material stake in Canadian
trade. . . . The exceptions, however, are important. "

Trade and Investment
Patterns: Montana and
Canada
trade agreement with
A free
Canada will have important

effects, but the agreement will have a
marginal effect on this country’
s
overall economic performance.
Increased trade is no panacea for
persistent, deeply-rooted economic
problems. Montana —compared to
other border states such as Michigan,
Minnesota, and Washington and to
high population and rapid growth
states in the West like California,
Texas, and Colorado —has a small
material stake in Canadian trade.
Montana’
s geography and resource
base are very similar to those of
neighboring Canadian provinces. But
lacking a comparable population,
there are few obvious reasons for
extensive trade to take place,
especially in the raw and semiprocessed commodities such as grain,
coal, and lumber that all possess in
abundance. The exceptions, however,
are important.
The bulk o f Montana’
s trade with
western Canada is in similar products:
chemicals, cattle, fertilizers, drilling
machinery, agricultural equipment,
and some wood products travel both
ways across the border. This trade
resembles the bilateral pattern, where
much of the $150 billion exchange is
in similar goods and services.
Comparative advantage applies to the
movement of phosphates and nonmetallic minerals north (that Montana
can produce at relatively low cost)
and in crude oil and natural gas
transfers to the south (mainly from
Alberta, which has large reserves of
both). Trade in crude materials is still
important, reflecting the dearth of
processing facilities on either side of
the border. Phosphate rock, for
example, is shipped to Canada to be
made into fertilizer; mineral
concentrates are sent to Montana to
be broken down into more refined
products.
The balance o f trade between
Montana and the neighboring
provinces seems lopsided in Canada’
s
favor. In 1986, Montana exported

approximately $89 million worth of
commodities to Canada and imported
$512 million (Office o f Canada 1988).
Most o f the estimated $423 million
“
deficit”is a result of the relative
economic power and export
orientation o f the western provinces
and U.S.-Canada exchange rates.
Regional balance of trade figures, like
the more familiar national ones, do
not show interest and dividend
payments, service expenditures and
tourism revenues flowing in both
directions. So, the overall “
balance of
payments”could tip the scale toward
transborder parity.
In addition, the best available
statistics, which come from Canada,
do not distinguish between goods
shipped to and from Montana, and
those transiting the state. More
significantly, trade flow data cannot
show the economic benefits of
imports. Montana refineries, for
example, rely upon Canadian crude
for about one-third of their oil supply.
Nearly three-fourths o f Montana’
s
trade deficit with Canada is
attributable to imports of this raw
product to which value is added in
the state.
Montana ranked seventh out o f ten
western states in terms of employment
generated by Canadian direct
investment. Canadian companies were
responsible for $963 million worth of
investment, directly employing over
1,200 Montana workers in 1987
(Office o f Canada 1988). This
proportion may be even greater now,
as a number of recently established
gold mining operations involve
Canadian partners. Opportunities for
joint ventures with U.S. firms, as well
as the quality, quantity, and location
o f Montana’
s precious metals, have
drawn the most Canadian capital to
the state. The real estate market is
another area o f concentrated
investment activity by Canadians,
particularly recreational properties in
the Flathead Lake area and
commercial properties in Billings.
Although the agreement is unlikely to
affect Canadian investors directly, the
declining value o f the U.S. dollar
should accentuate the attractiveness of
Montana’
s property and mineral
resources.
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Politics of the Agreement
The easiest, but overly simplistic, way
to assess the potential economic
impacts o f bilateral free trade is to
assemble lists o f “
winners”and
“
losers.”According to most
projections, the clear winners in the
United States are large financial
services firms, transnational
corporations (mainly in the
automotive, energy and
manufacturing sectors), and
consumers. The losers are presumed
to be some natural resource producers
mainly in the West, and
uncompetitive industrial plants
scattered across the country. Some
view the agreement as regionally
biased in favor o f the large, serviceand technology-based firms
concentrated in the East.
Several Montana industries have
voiced their strident disapproval of
the FTA. They support a coalition of
senators, mainly from the West, who
have sought to scuttle the deal unless
the negotiations are revised to deal
with issues about nonferrous metals,
coal, plywood, uranium, wheat and
natural gas. The general criticism is
that the FTA will have a materially
damaging effect because it eliminates
tariffs on imports from Canada but
allows Canada to keep export
subsidies in place. Thus, as would-be
“
free traders,”they assert that the
FTA is flawed because it does not go
far enough to guarantee “
fair trade”
as measured by the so-called “
level
playing field”(Baucus 1988).

Grain products
Canada shipped nearly 400,000 tons
o f wheat to the United States in 1986,
nearly all o f it destined for flour mills
in or near Buffalo, New York. Grain
growers are concerned that the FTA
would further open the U.S. border to
imports o f Canadian wheat by
abolishing the $.21 per bushel tariff.
Meanwhile, Canada’
s import licensing
system that effectively bans any
shipment of U.S. wheat into Canada
would stay in place.
While Canada’
s exports do not
compete directly with Montana grain
(over 80 percent of which is shipped
11

The appearance o f unfairness in rail subsidies and in
Canada's . . . restrictive import licensing fo r wheat also
hinges on the measurement and definition o f subsidies.
to Asian markets) the fear is that
these increases in Canadian exports
would shift North Dakota wheat from
the eastern to the Pacific market and
therefore put indirect pressure on
Montana producers. There is also a
concern that Canadian grain growers
might somehow take advantage o f the
U.S. Export Enhancement Program
incentives to include their wheat in
shipments to other countries.
The grain growers’main argument
is that the FTA does nothing about
Canadian “
Crow rate”rail freight
subsidies that give their Alberta and
Saskatchewan competitors an edge in
shipping eastward. In 1984, a phase
out program was initiated that shifted
the financial benefits from growers to
the railroads to ensure their viability
and mandated a number o f longoverdue technical improvements. Still,
American farmers complain that even
under the new formula, Canadian
competitors enjoy an advantage that
amounts to as much as one-quarter of
the world price of wheat (National
Association o f Wheat Growers 1987).
These arguments mix fact with
supposition. The fear about disrupting
the wheat market may not be wellfounded. New York purchasers of
Canadian wheat have claimed that
their decisions are based on quality as
well as price. Moreover, there may be
alternative markets for North Dakota
wheat, because the Export
Enhancement Program supports
shipments to a growing number of
less-developed countries in Africa,
Asia and Latin America. In short, the
anticipated increase in Canadian
wheat exports may not materialize,
and even if it does, the impact on
Montana wheat growers could be
negligible. Furthermore, the
agreement would allow the United
States to reimpose tariffs in the event
that import surges severely disrupted
domestic markets.
The appearance of unfairness in
rail subsidies and in Canada’
s
maintenance o f restrictive import
licensing for wheat also hinges on the
measurement and definition of
subsidies. Canada is obligated to
remove the trade barrier if and when
support for U.S. wheat growers is the
12

same as in Canada. A complex
formula was used to calculate the
value o f various government support
programs in both countries, including
Canada’
s railway subsidies for grain.
The results show that U.S. wheat
producers currently enjoy substantial
advantages. Recent USDA figures
support this conclusion; they indicate
American subsidies are over twice as
large as Canadian ones (Stokes 1987).
Wheat producers who are unhappy
with some terms of the agreement
tend to ignore others. The FTA would
establish a binational team to work
toward closer harmony in support
levels and thereby allow for future
reciprocity in global wheat trade. This
provision is arguably far more
important to Montana’
s grain industry
than those concerning cross-border
wheat trade. Enormously costly
subsidy wars between the world’
s grain
exporting giants are already straining
federal treasuries and undermining
the future o f Montana agriculture.
Joint action by the United States and
Canada to bring about the worldwide
abandonment o f agricultural export
subsidies is in the Montana farmer’
s
best interest (Allen 1987).

The Asarco smelter at East
Helena
Officials at the East Helena smelter
are concerned that the FTA’
s
elimination o f tariffs on Canadian
imports would threaten the operation’
s
economic viability. Mines in Idaho
that are located nearer a Canadian
smelter at Trail, British Columbia,
would no longer have a price
incentive to ship their ores to
Montana. The Lucky Friday mine, for
example, has contracted to divert a
portion o f its output to Trail in 1988.
There is no doubt that the
shutdown of the plant would be a
blow to Lewis and Clark County and
the city of East Helena. The company
has reminded state officials in recent
months that the smelter employs
approximately 350 workers and pays
nearly SI million in local property
taxes. The question is whether such a
closure would result sooner from
market conditions than from

Canadian competition. Under the
FTA, Asarco would have ten years in
which to adjust to the phased removal
o f the tariff that is only a modest 3
percent.
Asarco’
s main concern is with
subsidization. The Canadian
government provides direct and
indirect support to the minerals
extraction industries through the
operation o f publicly-owned “
Crown”
corporations and through various
grant, loan, and loan guarantee
programs for private firms. The NonFerrous Metals Producers Committee,
including Asarco, has argued that
federal and provincial subsidies
constitute “
perhaps the most serious
inequity in U.S.-Canadian trade
relations.”The committee opposes the
FTA on the grounds that “
it will
ultimately lead to a significant
competitive advantage for the
Canadian producers”(Muth 1988).
While it is true that total subsidy
payments to the Canadian smelter
amount to $135 million, over half
take the form o f equity investments
made by the Federal Business
Development Bank. The rest come
mainly from provincial and pollution
control programs, but in no instance
are the subsidies direct grants, as has
been alleged. At the same time,
Asarco’
s annual report for 1986 shows
that the company owes $37 million to
Lewis and Clark County for pollution
control bonds, generally considered a
subsidy because o f the deferred
payments and below-market interest
rates involved. United States trade
officials are justifiably circumspect
about crying foul until U.S. subsidies,
many of which are hidden by complex
formulas and technical jargon, are
identified for the purpose o f side-byside comparison.
The FTA calls for a five- to sevenyear period during which a binational
team of experts will try to find some
means of reconciling disparate
methods of providing public support
to a wide variety o f private industries
in the two countries. This allows for
the subsidy question to be resolved
prior to the complete removal of
tariffs in ten years. In the meantime,
the FTA does not preclude Asarco
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‘
‘
Some o f the FTA ’
s detractors seem to ignore the reality
that subsidies are a two-way street.
from using U.S. trade laws to combat
allegedly unfair subsidies given to
Canadian smelters, such as assistance
to reduce acid rain. Also, East Helena
may prove a potential case for
deserved federal adjustment assistance
if the U.S.-Canada agreement does in
fact lead to production curtailments,
lay-offs, or even closure. There are
also other important questions about
the long-term viability of lead
smelting in Montana — including
supply and demand factors, worker
health regulations, and corporate
strategy — that require additional
research and analysis.

Plywood
The FT A would remove the 20
percent U.S. duty and the 15 percent
Canadian duty on imported plywood.
United States plywood manufacturers
want the agreement to go one step
further, to require a change in the
Canadian standards that restrict the
importation o f U.S.-made plywood.
The American Plywood Association
argues that restrictive building codes
effectively prevent 80 percent o f U.S.
plywood from being sold in Canada.
The removal o f tariffs, therefore, will
only help Canadian producers to
increase their share of U.S. markets.
The British Columbia Council of
Forest Industries argues that Canadian
plywood, using indigenous species and
different veneers, is of much higher
quality than American, and that the
construction standards reflect this
qualitative difference. United States
producers claim that American CDX
plywood is as good as any in Canada
and that its use in Alaska belies
Canada’
s assertion that the American
product does not stand up to cold
weather. Because most other countries
accept U.S. plywood standards as
reliable trademarks, the Canadian
barrier is patently discriminatory
(American Plywood Association 1988).
Federal negotiators tried to fashion
a compromise on this issue by
requiring the Canada Mortgage and
Housing Corporation (similar to the
U.S. FHA) to evaluate American
plywood. In March, the CMHC
rejected the U.S. product on the basis
that lower production standards created

an unacceptable risk o f delamination
(a problem separate from that o f cold
weather durability). The U.S. industry
now has the option o f asking the
Canadian decision to be reviewed by
an investigative panel. If such a
review is requested, the panel would
have to complete its review by January
1, 1989. The American Plywood
Association will probably urge U.S.
officials to delay tariff revisions until a
satisfactory solution is reached
(Bureau o f National Affairs 1988).
Whether the FTA would result in
any injury to Montana plywood
production is unknown. Champion
International, after all, operates wood
products manufacturing plants in
both countries. In 1986, nearly $7
million worth of plywood, paperboard
and related manufactured wood
products were shipped to Canada
from Montana (Statistics Canada). It
makes sense that this volume would
increase with the removal o f the
tariffs, even if the building codes
remain in place.

Energy resources: coal,
uranium, and natural gas
Coal producers are concerned that the
FTA affords them no protection
against competition from new
Canadian power projects. One
allegation is that Canada does not
require equivalent pollution control
on thermal plants; the second is that
the provinces provide a variety of
subsidies to hydropower projects that
encourage dumping in U.S. markets.
In reality, Canada produces very little
electricity from coal and exports none
o f it. Further, Canada’
s treatment of
hydropower is very similar to the way
in which the U.S. government
developed the TVA and the Columbia
River: Canada simply enjoys the
advantage o f more numerous sites
suitable for development.
Rather than seeking the so-called
“
level playing field”in electricity,
some producers in the United States
sought to use the FTA negotiations to
retain markets likely to be lost to
comparative advantage in Canada.
The U.S. succeeded in maintaining
the status quo in the Pacific
Northwest where the Bonneville Power
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Administration can control access to
the California tieline as a way to
restrict imports from B.C. Hydro.
Coal companies did not achieve,
however, their goal o f putting controls
on the midwestem electricity market
that is already a model o f unrestricted
trade.
Uranium and natural gas are
similar cases. American producers
face competition from Canada’
s more
favorable production conditions.
Larger and higher-quality deposits of
some minerals, for example, are
classic cases o f comparative
advantage. New Mexico uranium
interests know that they cannot
compete with the richer grades of
Saskatchewan ore without some form
o f trade protection couched in the
language o f national security
(Haglund 1987). Alberta natural gas
also has a comparative advantage,
and some American producers are
concerned that they will be at a
disadvantage unless key regulations
are maintained with the passage of
the FTA (Coffield).
Montanans who remember the last
energy crisis (when the state received
half its gas from Canada) will recall
that the main concerns in the 1970s
were availability and reasonable
prices. It would seem ridiculous today
to seek to prevent Canada from
assuring U.S. consumers that they can
count on supply and fair prices in the
case of another energy crisis. All
aspects considered, the single most
important advantage of the FTA to
the United States may turn out to be
the guaranteed access to Canada’
s
energy resources (Netherton 1988).

A political overview
Some o f the FTA’
s detractors seem to
ignore the reality that subsidies are a
two-way street. In one sector after
another, the trade officials faced
difficult trade-offs because both
national economies are so laced with
direct and indirect subsidies. With
deadlines looming, the negotiators
finally backed away from putting all
subsidies on the table.
If the opponents are successful in
killing the FTA, in many cases they
will not have succeeded in addressing
IS

As with any deal between willing partners, both sides are
better o ff under the free trade agreement than without it."

*

the real grievances they raise. The
complications with regulation of
natural gas will remain. The alleged
subsidies of hydropower will be
unchanged. Canada will continue to
supply smelters with incentives that
help reduce acid rain. On the other
hand, passing the FT A does bind
both sides to a renewed examination
of which subsidies should be
considered fair and foul in the debate
over trade distortion. The two
countries can hardly be expected to
take the more difficult second step
until they have taken the first one—
the adoption o f the FT A as a
framework for ongoing talks.
A coalition of senators wants the
agreement renegotiated to address the
specific concerns o f the industries that
are vulnerable to changes in the world
market. This demand is unrealistic
since the senators know fully well that
it violates the procedure Congress
agreed to under the “
fast-track”
legislation. Once signed, the
agreement is a package. If one side
promotes “
clawbacks”into the
agreement (Rose 1987), the other will
be forced to counterattack and the
entire package could come undone.
That is one reason why U.S. trade law
separates executive branch
negotiations from the inherent
pressures for log-rolling in Congress.
If the “
level-playing field”objectors
are really serious about achieving free
trade, they should welcome the
provision in the agreement calling for
further negotiations to mutually
eliminate the subsidies that are out of
bounds.

The Challenge of Economic
Diversification
Peter Drucker argues
Economist
that the resource sector has been

separated from the industrial sector in
the world economy; the demand for
raw materials is on a downward
curve. The most pressing problems
with many agricultural and mineral
industries result from global
competition, and retaining a share of
shrinking markets is a daunting
prospect. Attacking the U.S.-Canada
FTA is largely an assault on
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symptoms, not causes o f economic
distress. Protecting jobs from import
competition in these sectors is likely
only to shift the burden to others.
Drucker advises that “
a country, an
industry or a company that puts the
preservation of ... jobs ahead of
international competitiveness will soon
have neither production nor jobs”
(Drucker 1986). In this paradigm, if
the Montana economy fails to make
the transition then it is destined to
decline.
There are many opportunities
under the FTA for expanding valueadded sectors. These are some of the
possible areas in which
entrepreneurial firms in Montana
might find a niche for their products
and services if Canadian tariffs are
removed:
•medical technology
•specialized food products
•athletic apparel and outdoor
recreation equipment
•chemical and pharmaceutical
products
•water quality, treatment,
storage methods and machinery
•pollution abatement techniques
•oil and gas exploration
equipment
•plant genetics and biotechnology
•computer applications to farming
and ranching
•waste and byproducts recycling
The Montana economy should not
rely only on commodities that
originate within the boundaries of the
state. The emphasis should be on
adding value, whether it is adding
value to Montana resource
commodities or combining Montana
talent with imported goods that are
re-exported. Efforts are already
underway in this direction, but more
work is needed. The FTA is one way
to invigorate these efforts.
Tourism is also a growth industry
enhanced by the FTA. Tourism is a
relatively recession-proof industry in
Montana, and Canadian visitors play
an important role in sustaining the
park facilities, hotels, restaurants, and
other travel-related businesses. In
1985, for example, more than 400,000

Canadians came to Montana and
spent over $32 million (Montana
Promotion Division 1987). There
appears to be a sort o f minimum
threshold for Canada’
s contribution to
Montana’
s tourist economy. Federal
Reserve Bank figures for the last five
years show, for example, that even
when the U.S. dollar is highly
overvalued there is a reliable stream
o f visitors from north o f the border.
Two major factors help explain this
pattern. First, Montana is the only
direct “
land bridge”for residents of
Alberta traveling to the United States.
The Albertan penchant for sunnier,
warmer climes in the winter months,
as well as many family ties across the
border, are a constant stimulus.
Second, higher relative prices in
Canada for gasoline, lodging,
restaurant food and entertainment
help to offset the unfavorable
exchange rate.
The FTA does not address currency
values. Freer trade, however, is likely
to bring the U.S. and Canadian
dollars into closer harmony over the
long run. The Canadian dollar has
appreciated significantly in recent
months, and although this trend
cannot be directly attributed to the
prospective trade agreement, it
nevertheless bodes well for Montana’
s
Canadian tourist connections. Even
without free trade, Canada is key to
the state’
s travel industry expansion.
The joint tourism promotion efforts of
Montana and Alberta officials,
emphasizing the “
two-nation vacation”
theme in foreign markets, is evidence
of a growing sense of
interdependence.

Conclusion
As with any deal between willing
partners, both sides are better off
under the free trade agreement than
without it. Within each country, the
benefits and risks are not shared
uniformly across all sectors. But care
has been taken to ensure that no one
region or industry is forced to carry
the burden of the agreement. The
changes rendered by the FTA are
implemented in stages. Many
safeguards are included to restore
equilibrium if certain trade-sensitive
sectors suffer unanticipated harm.
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The ten-year tariff reduction schedule
gives affected industries time to adjust
to new competition. Some provisions
can be abrogated through the
unilateral action o f either country if
there is an unwarranted surge of
exports. Finally, either nation can
terminate the agreement with only six
months’notice and it is automatically
repealed if the two nations fail to find
a definitive method o f dispute
resolution in the seventh year.
This cautious approach means that
the free trade agreement is neither the
salvation nor the bane of either
economy, but it does promise to
stimulate growth in each. Americans
and Canadians alike will be able to
purchase less expensive goods in the
neighboring country while overseas
imports are still subject to tariffs.
Canadian producers gain more
assured access to a larger market;
American producers gain because
Canadian tariffs are about twice as
high as those in the United States.
For Montana, free trade is no
panacea for economic difficulties and
the benefits cannot be distributed
equally in all sectors o f the state
economy. There will be adjustment
costs to some traditional producers.
On the other hand, many Montanans
will gain from the agreement. In
addition to the consumers who receive
lower prices and a greater variety of
goods and services to choose from, the
beneficiaries include aspiring
entrepreneurs in the value-added
industries that are the primary target
of economic diversification programs
in the state. They also include many
traditional producers who conveniently
forget that they have an interest in
lower input costs, like wheat farmers
who benefit from unregulated border
oil prices and inexpensive fertilizer
from Saskatchewan. They include all
Montanans o f the future, who will
gain through the FTA a right to share
Alberta’
s energy resources in the event
of an oil crisis.
On balance, the risks to the
Montana economy do not appear to
outweigh the gains o f going forward
with the free trade agreement with
Canada. The FTA provides an
important way to invigorate the valueadded sectors in Montana. If Peter
Drucker is correct, and the demand
for raw materials is on a downward
curve, the Montana economy must
choose to diversify if it is to survive. CD

This article is a summary o f an
extensive analysis o f the U.S.-Canada
free trade agreement. The fu ll report
is available in June from the 49th
Parallel Institute, Montana State
University. The authors would like to
acknowledge the Northwest Area
Foundation o f St. Paul, Minnesota
that provided the assistance fo r
research over a two-year period.
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Bad Faith:
Liability Law
in Montana
JERRY FURNISS
JACK MORTON
do we have a bad faith
W hyliability
problem in Montana?

Many are eager to place blame with
attorneys, while others quickly accuse
jurors of being too eager to dip into
the pockets of employers, bankers, or
insurance companies. Still others focus
attention upon the state legislature
and feel that it has attempted to over
regulate our lives. Almost unnoticed
in the hullabaloo, however, has been
the role played by the courts,
particularly the Montana Supreme
Court. The Montana Supreme Court
has, without reservation, adopted the
concept o f bad faith, a novel legal
theory that lies at the heart of the
liability debate that exists in Montana
today.
The Montana courts have been at
the nation’
s forefront in the
development and application of the
concept o f bad faith. Few states, if
any, have gone as far as Montana.
As an example, let’
s take a look at
the area o f employment law. L et’
s
assume that an employer has workers
in both Idaho and Montana. Our
employer has just decided to
terminate an employee in Montana,
and also terminate one o f his Idaho
employees. The reason the employer
gives for the terminations is that the
work simply has not met the
16

employer’
s expectations. Neither of
the workers had fixed-term
employment contracts. Both
employees were hired under what is
known as an employment-at-will
arrangement. Employment-at-will
simply means there is no fixed
employment term; the employer or
employee can terminate the
relationship at any time, that is, at
will.
Let us also assume that both
employees are upset with the
termination, and decide to pursue
legal action. The result of the Idaho
litigation will almost certainly be in
the employer’
s favor. T o quote a 1986
Idaho Supreme Court case,
The rule in Idaho, as in most
states, is that unless an employee
is hired pursuant to a contract
which specifies the duration of
the employment, or limits the
reasons for which the employee
may be discharged, the
employment is at the will of
either party, and the employer
may terminate the relationship at
any time for any reason without
incurring liability.
The outcome would likely be the
same in nearly every other state,
except Montana.
The result o f the Montana litigation
may well be totally different. Our
employee will almost certainly allege
that the employer was guilty o f bad
faith and may receive not only
compensatory damages for lost wages
but also punitive damages of perhaps
a million dollars or more.
The Montana court has decided
that all contracts including
employment contracts contain an
implied obligation o f good faith. That
would not create a serious problem if
it were not for the fact that the court
has declared that a lack o f good faith
can be established by mere
“
unreasonable”conduct or by conduct
which fails to meet “
the justifiable
expectations of the other party.”
Thus, a jury may get to review any
contracts to determine whether the
actions were unreasonable or contrary
to the other party’
s expectations.
Cases where the jury finds a lack of
good faith, are generally known as
bad faith cases.
The truly radical legal change came
when the court decided that bad faith
is not just a contract matter, but is
also a tort. With that decision, the

court put bad faith cases in the same
basket as the tort theories of fraud,
libel, assault, and battery. As a result,
juries can award not only
compensatory damages for breach of
contract but may also assess punitive
damages designed to punish the
aggrieving party if the tort of bad
faith is involved.
Because of the cou rt’
s extremely
liberal definition o f good faith, the
charge o f bad faith and the resultant
claim for punitive damages have now
become a standard factor in nearly all
contract disputes.
In most states today (and in
Montana, up until several years ago)
breach o f contract and tort lawsuits
are distinctly separate. In a contract
matter, it is assumed by the courts
that a party has the right to breach a
contract if the breaching party is
willing to compensate the other party
for actual damages. Those damages
are known as compensatory damages
and are designed to make the
aggrieved party whole. Normally the
jury is not allowed to punish the
breaching party by awarding punitive
s role is restricted
damages. The ju ry’
to awarding compensatory damages in
a breach of contract action to
compensate the aggrieved party for
actual damages incurred.
The issue of punitive damages
simply does not arise, in most states,
unless the matter involves an
intentional tort such as libel, slander,
assault, battery or fraud. Unlike
compensatory damages, punitive
damages are designed to actually
punish a party for having
intentionally committed a grievous
act. Punitive damages are designed to
make an example of the other party,
and are often known as exemplary
damages. While a ju ry’
s award of
compensatory damages can be
measured against an actual loss
incurred, juries have nearly unbridled
freedom to determine the amount of
punitive damages, and as a result,
multi-million dollar punitive damage
awards are not uncommon. In
Montana, this clear distinction
between contract and tort theory has
been eroded because o f Montana
court decisions. As a result, what used
to be simple breach o f contract
matters have now mushroomed into
complex actions involving the ominous
theories of bad faith and punitive
damages.
The development of bad faith as a

“The truly radical legal change came when the court
decided that bad faith is not just a contract matter, but is
also a tort.39
tort concept in Montana had its origin
in insurance cases. For the past twenty
years, Montana courts have expressed
concern about insurance companies
dragging their feet when settling
claims. Through a series o f cases, the
Montana courts attempted to
encourage insurance companies to
settle fairly and promptly by holding
that every contract contains an
implied promise or covenant o f good
faith.
Although the Montana courts have
not clearly defined bad faith, the
courts have indicated that bad faith
may be found in situations where a
contracting party’
s behavior is
malicious or oppressive. In recent
cases, however, the Montana Supreme
Court has extended the application of
bad faith to cases involving merely
unreasonable behavior by a
contracting party. In a 1986 case, the
Montana Supreme Court stated, “
In a
commercial setting we now have held
that where the conduct of one party
unreasonably breaches the justifiable
expectations of the other party, an
action in tort results.”
The Montana Supreme Court failed
to provide a definitive standard or test
for determining what is bad faith.
This has not, however, prevented the
court from applying the concept of
bad faith to a wide variety of
commercial transactions.

Bad faith in Montana banking
cases

T

he banking industry, in particular,
has had its practices
subjected to close scrutiny by the
Montana Supreme Court through the
application o f the bad faith concept.
One of the earliest banking bad faith
cases was the 1984 First National
Bank in Libby v. Twombly case. In
that case a First National Bank officer
made a $3,500 loan to the Twomblys
for the purchase o f an ice machine.
The Twomblys expected to use the ice
machine in a restaurant they hoped to
open. When the negotiations for the
purchase of a restaurant failed, the
Twomblys experienced financial
difficulties. They approached an
officer o f the bank who agreed to

extend the payment date on the loan.
Another officer of the bank, who was
not aware o f the bank’
s agreement to
extend the loan, called the loan due
and offset the Twomblys’checking
account, leaving them with a balance
o f only $1.65. The bank then sued
the Twomblys to recover the balance
owing on the loan. The Twomblys
counter-claimed against the bank for
bad faith. The Montana Supreme
Court held that the bank was liable
for bad faith and held the bank
responsible for punitive damages.
In 1985, the Montana Supreme
Court upheld another bad faith case
against a bank. The Tribby v.
Northwestern Bank o f Great Falls case
involved a jury award of $120,000
compensatory damages and $1 million
punitive damages. Tribby and a
relative were involved in a commercial
real estate venture. They had their
joint checking account at Norwest
Bank. The checking account contract
required signatures of both parties on
all checks. Tribby found, however,
that checks were being honored by the
bank without his signature. After
failing to resolve this problem with
the bank, Tribby filed suit against
Norwest. Norwest responded by
placing Tribby’
s outstanding loan on
a “
watch list”and refused to renew a
loan that had been renewed annually
for several years. Norwest Bank also
cancelled Tribby’
s Ready-Reserve
Account that had allowed Tribby to
write checks exceeding the balance in
his checking account. Although the
matter was eventually remanded for
retrial at the district court level due
to improper jury selection, the
Montana Supreme Court held that
this set of facts did merit the
application of the bad faith concept.
The court stated, “
We hold only that
the district court, under these
circumstances, did not err when it
instructed the jury to consider
recovery under tort principles and,
accordingly, punitive damages.”
In a 1987 case, Crystal Springs
Trout Co. v. First State Bank o f
Froid, the Montana Supreme Court
upheld an $800,000 judgment against
a bank officer, Jerry Wolinder, who
was unable to carry through on a
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promised extension of credit to the
trout farm. Wolinder had represented
that his bank would have “
no
problem”obtaining sufficient
financing for the trout farm
operation. Wolinder was, however,
unable to obtain the promised
financing and the trout farm
floundered. The court affirmed the
damage award against Wolinder
based on a lack o f good faith.
There have been numerous other
cases in Montana involving bank
practices and the concept of bad
faith. Bankers frequently find
themselves subject to litigation
involving customer complaints where
the bank has failed to extend credit
that was impliedly promised or merely
expected, or where they have
“
unreasonably”called loans due.
There have also been suits brought
against banks alleging that banks have
loaned too much money to borrowers,
and that the banks should have
known that the borrowers would not
be in a sufficient financial position to
repay the loans.

Bad faith in wrongful discharge
ca ses
area that has evolved very
Another
rapidly in Montana is the

wrongful discharge o f employees. The
Montana Supreme Court has implied
a covenant o f good faith and fair
dealing in the employment context
and has treated the breach o f this as
a tort with the resultant punitive
damages.
Historically, employers could
discharge employees without cause.
This doctrine, referred to as the atwill doctrine, has remained relatively
intact in all but a few states. The
Montana Supreme Court has gone
farther than any other court in
abolishing the employment-at-will
concept.
In 1983 in Gates v. Life o f
Montana Insurance Co., the Montana
Supreme Court first established the
requirement that employers deal in
good faith with their employees. Gates
was working under an oral contract
with no stated term and was
thereafter terminated without
17

The impact o f the bad faith concept on a wide variety o f
different transactions cannot be overestimated
warning. The court concluded that
the company’
s dismissal o f Gates
might violate an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The case
was remanded to a lower court for
determination of whether the dismissal
was in bad faith.
In a 1984 case, Adair v. Montana
Petroleum Marketing Co., the
Montana Supreme Court gave some
clarity to the issue o f when the
implied covenant o f good faith and
fair dealing would arise in the
employment setting. The court held
that the covenant o f good faith
existed whenever there were “
objective
manifestations by the employer giving
rise to the employee’
s reasonable
belief that he or she has job security
and will be treated fairly.”Although
the Adair case did not clearly define
what constituted a lack o f good faith,
it should put employers on notice that
destroying an employee’
s expectations
o f continued employment may
constitute bad faith and subject the
employer to punitive damages.
In 1986, the Montana Supreme
Court upheld an award o f $1.3
million in punitive damages in the
case o f Flanigan v. Prudential Federal
Savings and Loan Association. Mrs.
Flanigan had been an employee for
approximately thirty years and was
terminated from her position as loan
counselor based on an alleged
reduction in work force. The bank
president’
s testimony that referred to
Mrs. Flanigan as “
ballast”did not
help Prudential’
s position. The
Montana Supreme Court held that the
jury could have inferred malice from
Prudential’
s actions and that malice
could support an award of punitive
damages. The Flanigan case should
again be a reminder to employers that
they may be held liable for punitive
damages by disgruntled employees
who feel that their employers’actions
are unreasonable and thus constitute
bad faith.
Perhaps the most controversial
Montana bad faith case was a 1986
case from Butte, Dunfee v. BaskinRobbins, Inc. In this case Terrence
and Patricia Dunfee purchased a
Baskin and Robbins franchise
operation. The purchase price of
$71,000 was funded with an Small
18

Business Administration (SBA)
guaranteed loan. The franchise
operation was already located in the
Raymond Mini-Mall. The operation
was quite successful for a ten-month
period, at which time the
configuration of the mall’
s parking lot
was rearranged. The change in the
parking lot resulted in decreased
traffic, and the Dunfees desired to
move the operation to a larger mall,
the Butte Plaza. They contacted the
district manager of Baskin and
Robbins, Sharon McCarthy. She
informed the Dunfees that the
franchise could not be moved to
another mall because o f stipulations
in the existing lease. McCarthy did
not, however, contact the appropriate
Baskin-Robbins vice president to
ascertain whether the vice president
would approve such a move.
McCarthy also failed to tell the
Dunfees that the existing lease had
both a subleasing provision and a
right to terminate after five years.
The Dunfees were under the
mistaken impression that the lease
could not be terminated for a fifteenyear period. The operation eventually
failed and the SBA foreclosed on the
assets.
The Dunfees then brought the
action against Baskin and Robbins,
alleging bad faith. The jury agreed
with the Dunfees allegation and
awarded the Dunfees $300,000 in
punitive damages in addition to
$230,000 in compensatory damages.
Mrs. Dunfee testified that she had
become distraught when the operation
failed and that she had lost her self
esteem. Mrs. Dunfee testified also that
she tried to avoid going back into
Butte where she felt ashamed for
being recognized as a failure. The
jury recognized this as emotional
distress, and awarded Mrs. Dunfee an
additional $150,000 to compensate
her for mental and emotional distress.
The Montana Supreme Court
affirmed the district court judgment,
although it is important to note that
the decision was a four-to-three
decision, and that one o f the members
o f the majority, Justice Morrison, is
no longer a member o f the court.

Other applications
o f the bad faith concept
Theon impact
a wide variety of different

transactions cannot be overestimated.
The insurance industry, for example,
has been struck by both edges of the
sword. Insurance companies find that
they are faced with raising premiums
due to the increased risk that
businesses face from bad faith claims;
at the same time, insurance
companies are having to pay claims at
an accelerated rate because o f their
potential bad faith liability for not
promptly settling claims.
Surprisingly, pricing decisions by
businesses may also be subjected to
the bad faith concept. Recent court
cases in Oregon and California ruled
that banks’charges for insufficient
funds checks must be set in good
faith. Those courts held that banks’
service charges for insufficient funds
checks amounted to contracts of
adhesion because there was little
bargaining power between the
customer and the banks. In those
situations the courts held that the
banks, being in a superior bargaining
position, owed an obligation o f good
faith to the customers when setting
those service charges. As a result, the
banks have been subjected to class
action suits for up to $30 million. The
banks lost both o f those court cases
and review was denied by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
If the Montana courts follow the
same line o f reasoning and apply the
bad faith concept to the pricing
decisions of Montana businesses, the
result could be momentous for a
variety o f businesses. Not only banks,
but hospitals, title companies,
insurance companies, gasoline
distributors, and a variety of
professionals such as doctors, lawyers,
stockbrokers, accountants and real
estate brokers could be faced with
price-setting bad faith claims.
According to the court decisions in
California and Oregon, there appears
to be no way around the charge of
bad faith unless the businesses can
show that the individual charges
reasonably reflect the actual cost of
the service and that individual
customers are presented with a
Bad Faith/Fumiss and Morton
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meaningful opportunity to negotiate.
The results o f these tort cases could
dramatically change the way many
businesses handle their relationships
with their individual customers.

Constitutional background
the primary reason for the
Perhaps
lack o f legislative response to the

bad faith issue has been a provision in
the Montana Constitution, which
specifies that each injured individual
is entitled to full redress for any
injury. Prior to the last legislative
session, a variety o f factions
successfully proposed Constitutional
Initiative 30 (CI-30), which specified
that the legislature has the authority
to limit the amount o f recovery by
injured individuals. CI-30 was passed
by the voters, and the Montana
legislature did enact a number of
“
tort reform”measures in the last
session.
For instance, in the area of
employee discharge, the legislature
almost completely abolished the
recovery of punitive damages by an
aggrieved employee. According to the
new legislation, an employee who wins
in court will likely recover only
compensatory damages. In effect, this
legislation attempted to take the bite
out of employee discharge bad faith
cases.
The legislature also addressed the
issue o f the liability of corporate
boards of directors. Increasingly,
board members have found themselves
subjected to suits brought against
them by shareholders alleging that
board members were negligent or
careless in performing their duties. O f
course, these lawsuits are most
common in situations where the
corporation is not as profitable as
expected. The legislature attempted to
deal with this problem by providing
that corporations may, by shareholder
vote, amend their articles of
incorporation to provide that board
members will be liable only for
intentional actions that harm the
corporation, but will not be liable to
shareholders for mere negligence. This
change may make it easier for
corporations to obtain liability

insurance for their board members, as
well as to attract new board members.
It should be noted, however, that this
change applies only to those
corporations whose shareholders vote
to so amend their articles of
incorporation.
Much o f the hope for resolving the
bad faith issue rested upon bills
introduced in the last session to
change the Montana Supreme Court’
s
definition o f bad faith. Those bills
were very controversial, and the result
appears to be that the legislature has
simply codified the Supreme Court’
s
liberal bad faith definition. Rather
than greatly limiting the situations
where bad faith can apply, the
Montana legislature specified by
statute that bad faith actions can arise
from any situation involving either a
lack of honesty in fact or a failure to
observe reasonable commercial
standards. No doubt, the murky issue
o f reasonable commercial standards
will arise many times in future
litigation.
Not long after the legislative session
finished, the Montana Supreme Court
handed down a decision invalidating
CI-30 for various technical reasons.
The court was primarily concerned
with the process by which the
initiative had been presented to the
voters. Now that CI-30 has been
invalidated, even the limited tort
reform passed by the last session of
the legislature is certainly suspect.
Although there have not yet been any
Montana Supreme Court cases
invalidating any of the tort reforms
adopted by the last legislature, there
have already been a number of
challenges made in district courts to
those reforms. It would not be
unreasonable to expect that the tort
reforms passed by the legislature will
meet the same fate as CI-30 when
they get before the Montana Supreme
Court.
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The outlook
o f what happened to
Because
CI-30, we are again faced with a

great deal o f uncertainty. Another
version o f CI-30 may be proposed to
the voters. Some argue that all of the
tort reforms passed by the last session
o f the legislature will need to be
readopted by a future legislature if
the constitution is successfully
amended.
Another factor to consider is the
makeup of the Montana Supreme
Court. Now that Frank Morrison,
author of some o f the most farreaching bad faith decisions, has
resigned from the court to run for
governor, court observers are waiting
to see if the next series o f bad faith
cases take a different direction.
Montana businesses now face
greater uncertainty than ever. Because
o f doubt about the future direction of
the Montana Supreme Court, doubt
about the extent or availability of
insurance coverage, and doubt about
the applicability o f the tort reforms
passed by the last Montana
legislature, businesses need to be ever
more aware o f their potential liability
in the area o f bad faith.
□

Jerry Fumiss is an assistant professor
and Jack Morton is a professor in the
University o f M ontana’
s Department
o f Management. They are both
attorneys.
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A vailable

County Data Packages —containing pertinent in
formation about population, households, and
income —are an essential tool for sensible,
meaningful economic planning for your business
or agency. And now the County Data Packages
have been updated so you’
ll have the most
current county-level information available. In a
series of data tables, you’
ll find:
Population, by age and sex (1980-1986)
Households, by type (1980-1986)
Total personal income, nonfarm labor
income, property income, transfer pay
ments, and farm income (1980-1987)
Total personal income, by major compo
nent, and per capita income (1968-1986)
You can purchase the revised County Data
Packages individually at $10 per county. County
Data Packages for all fifty-six counties are
available for a total of $250.
If you would like to purchase a County Data
Package, or would like further information,
please contact the Bureau of Business and
Economic Research, University of Montana,
Missoula, 59812, (406) 243-5113.
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The Bureau of Business and Economic Research is the research and
public service branch of the University of Montana’
s School of Business
Administration.
The Bureau is regularly involved in a wide variety of activities, including
economic analysis and forecasting, forest products industry research, and
survey research.
The Bureau’
s Economics Montana forecasting system is an effort to
provide public and private decision makers with reliable forecasts and
analysis. It is made possible by a generous grant from U.S. West. These
state and local area forecasts are the focus of the annual series of
Economic Outlook Seminars, cosponsored by the respective Chambers of
Commerce in Missoula, Billings, Great Falls, and Helena.
The Bureau also has available county data packages for all Montana
counties. These packages provide up-to-date economic and demographic
information developed by the Bureau and not available elsewhere.
The Montana Poll, a quarterly public opinion poll, questions Montanans
about their views on a variety of economic and social issues. It is
cosponsored by the Great Falls Tribune. In addition, the Bureau conducts
contract survey research and offers a random digit dialing program for
survey organizations in need of random telephone samples.
The Forest Industries Data Collection System, a census of forest industry
firms conducted approximately every five years, provides a large amount of
information about raw materials sources and uses in Montana, Idaho, and
Wyoming. It is funded by the U.S. Forest Service. The Montana Forest
Industries Information System collects quarterly information on the
employment and earnings of production workers in the Montana industry.
It is cosponsored by the Montana Wood Products Association.
Readers of the M ontana Business Quarterly are welcome to comment on
the M B Qj request economic data or other Bureau publications, or to
inquire about the Bureau’
s research capabilities.

The M ontana Business Quarterly is currently supported by a generous grant from the Burlington Northern
Foundation, which represents the following Burlington Northern, Inc. subsidiaries: Burlington Northern
Railroad Company, Glacier Park Company, Meridian Minerals Company, Meridian Oil, Inc., and Plum Creek
Timber Company, Inc.
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